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Summaries 
George Peacock's A Treatise on Algebra of 1830, 
contained in its preface the first published 
recognition that Algebra need not necessarily 
be always associated with Arithmetic, and that 
non-arithmetical Algebras were possible. The 
work also contains the first statement of Peacock‘s 
principle of the permanence of equivalent forms. 
It is shown in this paper that Charles Babbage 
had all these ideas in almost identical or superior 
form in an unpublished work The Philosophy of 
Analysis written in 1821. Peacock certainly had 
access to his friend Babbage's writings, and the 
suggestion is made of unconscious assimilation 
rather than deliberate plagiarism. 
Dans la preface de A Treatise on Algebra, 
de 1830, George Peacock reconnaissait pour la 
premi&re fois dans une publication qu'une 
algebre n'a pas besoin n6cessairement d'btre 
associke B l'arithmetique et que des algebres 
non-arithm&iques Qtaient possibles. Ce trait& 
contient aussi la premiere enonciation du principe 
de Peacock de la permanence des formes 6quivalentes. 
lvous montrons dans cet article que Charles Babbage 
avait emis toutes ces id&es sous une forme 
presque identique et dans certainscas superieure, 
dans son oeuvre &rite en 3821 mais restee 
inedite, The Philosophy of Analysis. Peacock 
a certainement eu ac&s aux ecrits de son ami 
Babbage et il est sugger6 ici une assimilation 
inconsciente plutot qu'un plagiat db.Zib&$ de 
sa part. 
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Charles Babbage (1791-1871) and George Peacock (1791-1858) 
were members of the Analytical Society whose aim was to reform 
British mathematics in the early nineteenth century. Their 
achievement in persuading British mathematicians to use the 
'd* notation of Leibniz instead of the 'dots' of Newton is 
described in an earlier paper [Dubbey 19633. 
Peacock's major idea in algebra which he published in A 
Treatise on Algebra, Cambridge 1830, was to distinguish between 
arithmetical and symbolic algebra. Previously algebra had 
been considered only as arithmetic, with letters and symbols 
replacing the numbers. Peacock rightly found this unnecessarily 
restrictive since arithmetic is only one branch of algebra and 
not the whole discipline. He makes this point in his definition 
of algebra, "ALGEBRA may be defined to be, the science of 
general reasoning by sgtilical language. . . . it has been termed 
Universal Arithmetic: but this definition is defective, in as 
much as it assigns for the general object of the science, what 
can only be considered as one of its applications." [Peacock, l] 
It will be useful for our purposes to see how Peacock 
comes to this conclusion in the preface to his book, and then 
to evaluate the degree to which he was anticipated by Babbage 
roughly nine years earlier. 
Peacock first indicates the way algebra had previously 
been regarded: "Algebra has always been considered as merely 
such a modification of Arithmetic as arose from the use of 
symbolical language, and the operations of one science have 
been transferred to the other without any statement of an exten- 
sion of their meaning and application." [Peacock, viJ 
He next distinguishes between the formal symbols of 
algebra and their more restricted meaning when used in arithme- 
tic: "The imposition of the names of Addition and Subtraction 
upon such operations, and even their immediate derivation from 
a science in which their meaning and application are perfectly 
understood and strictly limited, can exercise no influence upon 
the results of a science, which regards the combinations of signs 
and symbols only, according to determinate laws, which are 
altogether independent of the specific values of the symbols 
themselves." [Peacock, vii] 
This makes algebra a much more general subject in which 
the symbols and expressions used mean no more or less than what 
they are defined to mean. One possible interpretation of an 
algebraic expression is the corresponding arithmetical one; 
but it is only one. It is possible, for example, to interpret 
signs like + and x other than in the conventional way and obtain 
an equally consistent system. This means "... that Arithmetic 
can only be considered as a Science of Suggestion, to which the 
principles and operations of Algebra are adapted, but by which 
they are neither limited nor determined." [Peacock, viii] 
Peacock then gives a more general meaning to the 'I=" sign. 
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"The fundamental operations of Algebra are altogether symbolical, 
and we might proceed to deduce symbolical results and equivalent 
forms by means of them without any regard to the principles of 
any other science; and it would merely require the introduction 
of some such sign as = in the place of the words algebraical 
result of, or algebraically equivalent to, to connect the results 
obtained with the symbolical representation of the operations 
which produce them." [Peacock, xi] 
Having stated general principles, he then shows their 
implications by mean of examples. "The expression - b f a is 
algebraically equivalent to a - b; if a and b be quantities 
of the same kind, and if a be greater than b, then a - b admits 
of an immediate and simple interpretation: but it is only by 
reference to this second and equivalent form that we are 
properly enabled to interpret the first." [Peacock, xiv] 
Since algebra is a generalization rather than a symboliza- 
tion of arithmetic, it can be used to generalize arithmetical 
results, and this leads to the first statement of Peacock's 
principles: "If m and n be whole numbers, then ma + na = (m+n)a, 
s; l~kewi~~nin the other, under the same circumstances 
a Xa =a : and in as much as in one case, the principle of 
the permanence of equivalent forms would show that ma + na = 
(m+n)a, when m and n are general symbols affected with any signs 
whatever, so likewise in the other, the same principle, ur;t$$r 
the same circumstances, would equally show that amXan =a ; 
the interpretation of the meaning of particular values of the 
index, whether fractional or negative, is involved in this 
conclusion, which becomes the principle of the indices; and it 
becomes, therefore, the general principle which must not only 
determine the interpretation of indices when they are assumed, 
but must guide us conversely to the determination of the indices, 
which must be assumed to suit a specific interpretation." 
[Peacock, xvi-xvii] 
These examples make the principle abundantly clear. 
Results like the index law of multiplication which are demonstra- 
bly true when the indices are positive integers are used to 
give meaning to fractional and negative indices. 
The principle is necessary to give meaning to various 
expressions outside the range of arithmetic: 
number, 
"If n be a whole 
the existence of the equivalent series for (1 + x) is 
necessary, in as much as the operation which produces it may 
be completely defined; but if n be a general symbol, we are 
unable to define the operation by which we pass from (1 + x)" 
to its equivalent series, which exists therefore under such 
circumstances, only in virtue of the principle of the permanence 
of equivalent forms." [Peacock, xviii-xix] 
Mathematicians had been using this principle unconsciously 
for centuries. No one until the time of Babbage and Peacock 
had pointed out this essential distinction between arithmetic 
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and algebra, thereby releasing the latter from its arithmetical 
bondage to develop in the following century as a much more 
general subject in its own right. 
Before considering Babbage's ideas, we may summarise 
Peacock's thesis under the following headings: (1) Algebra had 
previously been considered only as a modification of Arithmetic. 
(2) Algebra consists of the manipulation of symbols in a way 
independent of any particular interpretation. (3) Arithmetic 
is only a special case of Algebra - a "Science of Suggestion" 
as Peacock put it. (4) The sign "=" is to be taken as meaning 
"is algebraically equivalent to". (5) The principle of the 
permanence of equivalent forms. 
Charles Babbage wrote a set of mathematical essays with 
the general title "The Philosophy of Analysis" in 1821. Only 
one of these was ever published. The remainder are bound in a 
single volume and can be found in the British Museum Manuscripts 
Room as Additional Manuscripts 37202. The list of essay 
headings is: 
On Notation. 
Of the influence of general signs in analytical reasonings. 




Of the law of Continuity. 
Of the value of a first book. 
Of Artifices, 
Of problems requiring new methods where the 
difficulty generally consists in putting it 
into Analytical language. IBM37202, 31 
The mode of writing suggests a hastily compiled first version. 
There is almost no regard for punctuation, some calculations are 
repeated and many of the ideas are presented in note form. 
The essay which relates strongly to Peacock's work is the third 
one, "General notions respecting Analysis". 
Peacock certainly read these essays and found them diffi- 
cult. A letter written to Babbage dated 7 May 1822 says: "I 
shall send your essays tomorrow morning by coach. I have read 
the greater part of them over very attentively, a task which 
you will readily acknowledge as of some difficulty considering 
the manner in which they are written; in some cases I have been 
completely baffled in my attempt particularly in the latter part 
of the first essay and in the greatest part of the second. I 
have, before expressed my opinion concerning them; they must 
from when completed a work of very great interest, abounding as 
they do with so much of original research and with illustrations 
of the most interesting kind; the essay on artifices and on 
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questions requiring new methods of Analysis will be charming 
when completed.*' [BM37182 No. 4111 
It is interesting to bear in mind Peacock's difficulties 
as we now consider the content of Babbage's third essay. It will 
be seen that not only are Peacock's five points anticipated, 
but the method of argument is very similar. 
Babbage begins: "Algebra appears at its first invention to 
have consisted of little more than the emplo~ent of a letter 
to represent a number to be determined by the condition of the 
problem. . . . its use was, therefore, restricted to arithmetical 
enquiries." [BM37202, 411 
Here we have Peacock's first point (1) that algebra had 
at first been thought of as symbolised arithmetic. However, 
Babbage admits that its use has been somewhat wider than this: 
"To the dominion of number which algebra now possessed Descartes 
added that over space and large as was this addition to its 
empire it was perhaps scarcely less valuable as pointing out the 
road to other acquisitions." He continues: "The representation 
of time and force by means of letters and the applications of 
algebra to mechanics optics and other parts of natural philosophy 
follows with little effort when the road was once opened." 
[ibidem, 411 
Algebra is capable of being interpreted in all these ways 
and yet the sum of all possible interpretations is not the 
complete discipline. To think of Algebra only in terms of such 
interpretations is to restrict the subject unnecessarily: "The 
cause which has mainly contributed to better the language of 
signs may be found in this circumstance; that being in itself a 
method of reasoning of extreme generality it was discovered 
through the medium of one of its particular applications that of 
number; now although number itself is an abstraction and in a 
certain measure affects almost all the applications of analysis 
it is still of a far less general nature and in several instances 
has limited the signification of symbols by a reference to its 
peculiar nature." [ibidem, 42-431 
The arithmetical interpretation thus imposes restrictions 
of an arithmetical and not an algebraical nature, "Number is 
undoubtedly one of the most extensive of the subjects to which 
Analysis has been applied; geometry holds the second rank in 
point of extent neither of these can express all the relations 
indicated by the language of signs: the square root of a whole 
number for instance is not capable of numerical expression in 
finite terms unless it be a complete square; whilst in geometry 
it is always possible to express the result of such an extraction 
by means of a right angled triangle: if a negative sign is 
prefixed to the quantity whose root is to be extracted both 
arithmetic and geometry equally fail in executing the operation." 
[ibidem, 461 
Babbage now attempts to show how Algebra can be treated 
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as a mathematical discipline in its own right, freed from the 
necessity to interpret at all times: “The object which I 
propose to attempt is to separate entirely Analysis or the 
language of signs from all its various applications rejecting 
from it not merely geometrical considerations but even those of 
number and to show that when viewed in this light it ultimately 
resolves itself into propositions which are purely identical or 
at least that the signification of every equation amounts to no 
more than that when all the operations which are indicated on 
each side are actually executed every letter which occurs on the 
other side will be found occurring under precisely similar 
circumstances on the other and in any case any letters stand as 
representatives of others these latter must be substituted for 
them before the identity becomes apparent.“[ibidem, 441 
This means that Algebra is to be considered as the formal 
manipulation of symbols by prescribed rules. These rules may be 
interpreted but are formulated in a way independent of any inter- 
pretation, numerical or otherwise (Peacock’s (2) above). How 
this can be done is shown in the following example: “In the 
equation (a + x}~ 
3 
3a x + 3ax2 
2 =a + + x3 the identity of the 
two sides is readily made manifest; nothing further is required 
than actually performing the two multiplications which are only 
expressed on the left side and it will then be found that each 
letter is exactly similarly situated on each side and that the 
whole is reduced to zero by the mutual destruction of terms. 
Now it is important to observe that this destruction is entirely 
independent of the nature of the things denoted by a and x and 
of whatever class they may be it must equally take place.” 
[ibidem, 451 
The purely operational nature of Algebra is carried a 
stage further by an application to the theory of infinite series, 
and used to explain an apparently paradoxical result. From the 
binomial expansion l/(1 + x) = 1 - x + x2 - x3 + . . . . putting 
x = 1, the result becomes l/2 = 1 - 1 + 1 - 1 + . . . which 
according to Babbage “cannot possibly be numerically true. ” 
[BM37202, 481 However, if both sides of the equation are inte- 
grated the result log (1 + x) = x/l - x2/2 + x3/3 - . . . is 
obtained, and this time when x = 1 the “true” result log 2 = 
1 - l/2 + l/3 - . . . is obtained. This paradox, Babbage now 
shows, can be resolved by reconsidering the “=” symbol. The 
2 3 
equation l/(1 + x) = 1 - x + x - x + ,.. must be replaced by 
the true proposition (1 - (-x)~+‘)/(~+x) = 1 
2 
-x+x -... 
(-$xn from which, on integration, 
log (1+x) + (-l)n 7 x 
n+l dx/(l+x) = x/l - x2/2 * x3/3 .*. I-1) 
1-13 
n-l n x /n which can also be written as: 
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log (1 + x) + (-l)n~n’z/(n~Z) (1+x) + (-l)n/(n+2) I x”+‘dx/(l+x)’ = 
= x/l - x2/2 + x3/3 n-l n - . ..+ I-1) x /n. 
He concludes : lVEvery‘stage of this process is reducible 
to identity and is quite independent of the magnitude of x.” 
[ibidem, 491 
This example not only illustrates again the symbolic 
nature of Algebra, but also shows how the equality symbol should 
be used particularly when infinite series are concerned. In the 
arithmetical sense of the symbol, the equation 
1/(1+x)=1-x+x -x3+ 2 , ., is untrue, as the particular 
case x = 1 shows; but if the symbol is taken to mean “is derived 
by algebraical rules from ” then the equation is true (Peacock’s 
(4))s and can also be made arithmetically true by the introduc- 
tion of the remainder term C-x) n+l/(l + x). An infinite series 
is then shown to exist in the algebraic and therefore the more 
general sense, with arithmetical interpretation under particular 
circumstances, for example, when the series is convergent (Peacock’s 
(3)). This sort of analysis is a necessary preliminary to the 
introduction of infinite series, and obviously superior to a 
purely arithmetical development. As Babbage puts it: “Such an 
explanation by no means banishes the use of infinite series, 
it merely delays their introduction a few stages later and the 
slight addition which is thus made to the length of the opera- 
tions is more than counterbalanced by the logical precision which 
it introduces and by removing a source of error to which our 
reasonings would otherwise be open.” {ibidem, SO] 
We have now found arguments equivalent to the first four 
of Peacock’s. The fifth, tantamount to the Principle of the 
Permanence of Equivalent Forms is to be found on page 43: 
b 
-xa x x 
a+b 
=x * This equation which is true for whole numbers 
does not necessarily subsist when the exponents are fractions 
nor does the latter follow from the original assumptions; still 
less does it subsist necessarily when a and b are imaginary 
quantities. In order to give meaning to such expressions we 
must have recourse to a new definition and to avoid ambiguity 
it is extremely convenient that the new definition should 
include the old one as a particular case this has been 
accomplished by assuming ‘the equation xa X x 
b a+b =x as the 
definition of the operations denoted by the application of the 
exponents to the quantity x.” 
While including all of Peacock’s ideas on the subject, 
Babbage’s exposition is actually superior in that he uses the 
basic equation in order to define new expressions and suggests 
that the idea could be extended to the field of complex numbers. 
We have now established a quite remarkable similarity in 
the thinking of two contemporary mathematicians, and we have the 
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evidence of Peacock's letter that he had read Babbage's work 
nine years prior to his own publication. However, there is not 
a shred of additional evidence to support a charge of plagiarism. 
Peacock's subsequent letters to Babbage in the B.M. col- 
lection are all short, trivial and friendly. The first one after 
the publication of A Treatise on Algebra is dated June 18th 1833, 
has no mathematical content at all, and ends: "I will get your 
rooms ready . . . if you come by the Telegraph. Believe me My 
dear Babbage Most truly yours G. Peacock.'* [BM37187, 5631 The 
remaining nine letters spread over the next seventeen years are 
about subscription lists, academic politics, examination results, 
booking rooms, and proposing votes of thanks. The only one which 
indicates anything at all about their personal relationship was 
written by Peacock in 1850: "I was very glad to see your hand- 
writing again as it is so long since I have heard from you." 
pM37194, 3751 
In view of such lack of evidence it seems idle to put 
forward any theory to account for the astonishing similarity of 
Babbage's unpublished and Peacock's published work. It might 
even be possible that Peacock took in Babbage's ideas un- 
consciously and with full integrity turned them out as his own 
a few years later. In any case, Babbage was too busy working 
on his computer and reforming British science generally to 
worry very much about the priorsty of any of his inventions in 
pure mathematics. Sufficient to say that in the discovery of 
so called "modern algebra If Babbage's work in 1821 was substantial. 
It is remarkable too that at the very period in history 
when significant steps were being taken to release geometry 
from its Euclidean shackles, a similar movement was taking place 
quite independently, to rescue algebra from arithmetic. 
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